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I. INTRODUCTION
At a Local Shire Council meeting in Western Australia, a Councillor said “we shoot them” in response to a discussion about a group of
homeless Aboriginal people.1 The Councillor was ordered to pay
$1,000 compensation by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission, and he also apologized and completed cultural awareness training.2 In an interview with a Western Australian newspaper
journalist, a senior officer of the “One Nation” political party said
“ ‘[h]ome invasions are ethnically based, Lebanese or Iranian, not
Australian.’ ”3 He was ordered to pay $1,000 compensation and publish a retraction.4 A resident of a Sydney apartment block yelled racist comments at another resident and was ordered to pay $5,000
compensation.5 A diner owner whose premises had been vandalized
put up signs, such as “Not open due to destructive Aborigines,” and
the noticeboard then attracted racist graffiti that was not removed by
the owner.6 The diner owner was ordered to apologize to a respected
Aboriginal community leader who had complained.7
Australia has a network of state and federal laws that proscribe
hate speech of this kind.8 The amounts of compensation ordered in
these cases are relatively small, but in many cases, it is the orders to

∗ Senior Lecturer, Flinders University of South Australia Law School.
1. Jacobs v. Fardig (1999) E.O.C. ¶ 93-016, (1999) HREOCA 9, ¶ 3.1 (find at
http://austlii.edu.au).
2. Id., (1999) HREOCA ¶ 6.
3. Feghaly v. Oldfield (2000) E.O.C. ¶ 93-090.
4. Id.
5. Anderson v. Thompson (2001) N.S.W.A.D.T. 11, ¶ 37 (find at http://austlii.edu.au).
6. Warner v. Kucera (2001) E.O.C. ¶ 93-137.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Racial Discrimination Act, 1975 (Austl.); Discrimination Act, 1991
(Austl. Cap. Terr.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1977 (N.S.W.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1991
(Queensl.); Racial Vilification Act, 1996 (S. Austl.); Civil Liability Act, 1936, § 73 (S.
Austl.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1998 (Tas.); Racial and Religious Tolerance Act, 2001
(Vict.); Criminal Code, §§ 76-80F (W. Austl.).
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apologize,9 to retract, or to cease distribution that have the greatest
impact upon those found culpable and upon broader public debate.
The prospect of being embroiled in proceedings before a commission,
tribunal, or court can have a chilling effect on free speech. In cases in
which the complaints have been dismissed,10 the speakers and publishers were nevertheless drawn into conciliation or court proceedings; this can have a chilling effect on future speech. Many of the
cases involving hate speech attract little attention outside of the law
reports, but there have been some high-profile cases that have come
before the courts and have been reported in the media.11 These cases
include a claim of vilification of Islam brought against a Christian
preacher12 and complaints about Holocaust denial and anti-Semitic
literature.13
Referred to as “racial vilification” in Australia,14 these hate speech
laws at state and federal levels have an impact on public debate by
9. Apologies are sometimes ordered, but some magistrates and judges have expressed doubts about the utility of such orders. “An apology should come from the heart
and not be the subject of a court order.” San v. Dirluck Pty Ltd. (2005) 222 A.L.R. 91, ¶ 49,
(2005) F.M.C.A. 750, ¶ 49 (find at http://austlii.edu.au).
10. Several complaints were not sustained as vilification. See, e.g., Miller v. Wertheim
(2002) E.O.C. ¶ 93-182, (2002) E.O.C. ¶ 93-223, (2002) F.C.A. 156, ¶ 1 (find at
http://austlii.edu.au) (involving criticism of the Orthodox Jewish community in a speech at
a Jewish Board of Deputies meeting); Bryl v. Kovacevic (1999) E.O.C. ¶ 93-022, (1999)
HREOCA 11, ¶¶ 1, 7 (find at http://austlii.edu.au) (involving a theatrical play about the
turmoil in Bosnia-Herzegovina); Francis v. YWCA Austl. (2006) V.C.A.T. 2456, ¶ 3 (find at
http://austlii.edu.au) (involving a t-shirt with the words “get your rosaries off my ovaries”);
Fletcher v. Salvation Army Austl. (2005) V.C.A.T. 1523, ¶ 1 (find at http://austlii.edu.au)
(involving a claim that Christian teaching vilified witchcraft); Judeh v. Jewish Nat’l Fund
of Austl. Inc. (2003) V.C.A.T. 1254, ¶¶ 9, 10 (find at http://austlii.edu.au) (involving an advertisement in a newspaper with the outline of a map of Israel that incorporated Palestinian semiautonomous areas).
11. See, e.g., Amir Butler, Opinion, Muzzling the Haters Doesn’t Mean That Hate Has
Vanished, AGE (Melbourne), Jan. 4, 2005, at 11; Ian Gerard, Opinion, ‘Racist’ Website Material Banned, AUSTRALIAN, Sept. 18, 2002, at 5; Moira Rayner, Why Not Just Let the Truth
Speak for Itself?, AGE (Melbourne), Jan. 6, 2005, at 11; Brett Stubbs, Campaigner to Defy
Race Law Ruling, MERCURY (Hobart), Sept. 27, 2000, at 9; Barney Zwartz, Pastors Will
Keep ‘Telling Truth’ on Muslims, AGE (Melbourne), Dec. 15, 2006, at 5; Barney Zwartz,
Pastors Vow to Go to Jail on Hate Case, AGE (Melbourne), June 23, 2005, at 3.
12. Catch the Fire Ministries, Inc. v. Islamic Council of Vict. Inc. (2006) 15 V.R. 207,
(2006) V.S.C.A. 284 (find at http://austlii.edu.au). The matter was remitted to the tribunal
by the Court of Appeal and then settled by the parties. Press Release, Vict. Civil and Admin. Tribunal, Joint Statement of the Islamic Council of Victoria Inc., Catch the Fire Ministries Inc., Daniel Nalliah and Daniel Scot (June 22, 2007), available at
http://www.vcat.vic.gov.au.
13. E.g., Jones v. Bible Believers’ Church (2007) F.C.A. 55, ¶ 2 (find at
http://austlii.edu.au) (material published on the Internet); Toben v. Jones (2003) 129
F.C.R. 515, 517, (2003) F.C.A. 137, ¶ 2 (find at http://austlii.edu.au) (material published on
the Internet); Jones v. Scully (2002) 120 F.C.R. 243, 246, (2002) F.C.A. 1080, ¶ 1 (find at
http://austlii.edu.au) (material published in pamphlets).
14. See, e.g., Discrimination Act, 1991, §§ 66-67 (Austl. Cap. Terr.); AntiDiscrimination Act, 1977, § 20C-20D (N.S.W.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1991, §§ 124A,
131A (Queensl.); Racial Vilification Act, 1996 (S. Austl.); Racial and Religious Tolerance
Act, 2001, § 7 (Vict.).
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proscribing some, but not all, kinds of vilifying speech. The extent of
that impact, and whether the legislation can be justified on public
policy grounds, has been a topic of concern for many years.15 When
these laws were passed, there was significant debate in the media
and parliaments about the potential impact upon free speech.16 A
good deal of attention in that early debate was focused on criminal
sanctions that have never been deployed. Concerns about the impact
of the civil complaint procedures were allayed by exemptions designed to protect public debate, the media, academic inquiry, and artistic expression. The impact of these exemptions is the central
theme in this Article.
With limited constitutional protection for free speech and a complex network of legislation, Australia offers an interesting case study
for the impact of hate speech laws in practice.17 In this Article, I argue that, in many cases, the Australian racial vilification laws favor
certain voices over others. Privileged speakers, who conform to judicial interpretations of reasonableness, are exempted; those who use
inflammatory or intemperate language are silenced. These laws restrict the form of expression rather than the racist message itself.
Thus, it is not so much what you say, but how you say it.
Public debate can be impoverished by this exclusion of marginal
voices that do not conform to legal standards of reasonableness and
so are subject to hate speech laws. At the same time, racist material
communicated by speakers who know and are comfortable with the
rules of the game can undermine the objectives of the legislation.
Court findings that expressions of racial hatred are “reasonable,”
even though such expressions are hateful, are troubling. Exemptions
of this kind of speech may be treated as authoritative and therefore
reinforce the racist messages that the legislation was intended
to proscribe.

15. See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 24-25 (citing popular and scholarly debate on
impact and justification of racial vilification laws).
16. Luke McNamara & Tamsin Solomon, The Commonwealth Racial Hatred Act 1995:
Achievement or Disappointment?, 18 ADEL. L. REV. 259, 271-77 (1996) (Austl).
17. As early as 1995, Luke McNamara called for the adoption of empirical perspectives and “an assessment of the relative merits of different models of legal intervention.”
Luke McNamara, The Merits of Racial Hatred Laws: Beyond Free Speech, 4 GRIFFITH L.
REV. 29, 30 (1995). Katharine Gelber and Adrienne Stone have argued that because hate
speech laws exist in Australia, an “intellectual space” is raised for questions such as: who
are the hate speakers and what types of hate speech are targeted by these laws? Katharine
Gelber & Adrienne Stone, Introduction, in HATE SPEECH AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN
AUSTRALIA xiii, xiv (Katharine Gelber & Adrienne Stone eds., 2007).
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II. DELICATE FLORA: FREE SPEECH IN AUSTRALIA
Free speech in Australia has been described as “a delicate plant.”18
Australia does not have an entrenched protection for free speech, but
there is some limited protection for political expression implied from
our system of representative government established by the Australian Constitution.19 This implied freedom is limited to communications relating to political or governmental matters. Legislation that
burdens political communications may still be valid if it is reasonably
appropriate and adapted to serve a legitimate end that is compatible
with the maintenance of a system of representative and responsible
government. The Federal Court20 and Victorian Court of Appeal21
have held that the vilification statutes are reasonably and appropriately adapted to serve the legitimate end of preventing vilification.22
While the Australian Constitution was no barrier to passing Australia’s hate speech laws, concerns for the protection of free speech
were raised when the laws were introduced, and free speech sensitivities have shaped judicial interpretation of the laws.23 There were
free speech debates in the press24 and amongst academics25 when the
18. MICHAEL CHESTERMAN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AUSTRALIAN LAW: A DELICATE
PLANT 1 (2000).
19. This implied freedom of political expression has been developed in a series of High
Court decisions dating back to 1992. See, e.g., Coleman v. Power (2004) 220 C.L.R. 1,
(2004) H.C.A. 39 (find at http://austlii.edu.au); Lange v. Austl. Broad. Corp. (1997) 189
C.L.R. 520, (1997) H.C.A. 25 (find at http://austlii.edu.au); Australian Capital Television v.
Commonwealth (1992) 177 C.L.R. 106, (1992) H.C.A. 45 (find at http://austlii.edu.au).
20. Toben v. Jones (2003) 129 F.C.R. 515, 551-52, (2003) F.C.A. 137, ¶¶ 141-48 (find
at http://austlii.edu.au); Jones v. Scully (2002) 120 F.C.R. 243, 304-06, (2002) F.C.A. 1080,
¶¶ 234-42 (find at http://austlii.edu.au).
21. Catch the Fire Ministries, Inc. v. Islamic Council of Vict. Inc. (2006) 15 V.R. 207,
¶¶ 113, 210, (2006) V.S.C.A. 284, ¶¶ 113, 210 (find at http://austlii.edu.au).
22. See, e.g., Nicholas Aroney, The Constitutional (In)validity of Religious Vilification
Laws: Implications for Their Interpretation, 34 FED. L. REV. 287 (2006) (Austl.) (discussing
the religious vilification laws as they relate to the High Court’s decisions, which imply a
freedom of political communication).
23. Luke McNamara, Does a Bill of Rights Matter?: Comparing Australia and New
Zealand, in HATE SPEECH AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AUSTRALIA, supra note 17, at 194,
212-13; LUKE MCNAMARA, REGULATING RACISM: RACIAL VILIFICATION LAWS IN AUSTRALIA
102-07 (2002).
24. See, e.g., Robert Manne, Opinion, Race Bill an Offence Against Free Speech, AGE
(Melbourne), Nov. 16, 1994, at 19 (arguing against the Bill on the grounds of free speech);
Racial Bill Problems, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Nov. 2, 1994, at 16 (stating that the case
for vilification legislation is not proved); Colin Rubenstein & Michael Kapel, Sending out
the Right Signals, AGE (Melbourne), Nov. 21, 1994, at 9 (arguing for the Bill).
25. See, e.g., Nancy Hennessy & Paula Smith, Have We Got It Right? NSW Racial Vilification Laws Five Years On, 1(1) AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 249 (1994); Jeremy Jones, Holocaust Denial: “Clear and Present” Racial Vilification, 1(1) AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 169 (1994);
Melinda Jones, Empowering Victims of Racial Hatred by Outlawing Spirit-Murder, 1(1)
AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 299 (1994) [hereinafter Jones, Empowering Victims]; Kathleen Mahoney, Hate Vilification Legislation and Freedom of Expression: Where Is the Balance?, 1(1)
AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 353 (1994); Tamsin Solomon, Problems in Drafting Legislation
Against Racist Activities, 1(1) AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 265 (1994).
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Federal Racial Hatred Bill was introduced in 1994.26 Free speech was
raised both as grounds for opposing and supporting the legislation.
Legislative restrictions on speech were decried by some commentators, but other commentators argued that hate speech, if unopposed,
has a chilling effect because it excludes some minority participants
from public debate and belittles their voices if raised.27 The Explanatory Memorandum to the Federal Bill declared that the legislation
maintained a “balance between the right to free speech and the protection of individuals and groups from harassment and fear because
of their race, colour or national or ethnic origin.”28 In his Second
Reading Speech on the Racial Hatred Bill, the Federal Attorney General, Mr. Lavarch, stated:
The bill places no new limits on genuine public debate. Australians
must be free to speak their minds, to criticise actions and policies
of others and to share a joke. The bill does not prohibit people from
expressing ideas or having beliefs, no matter how unpopular the
views may be to many other people. The law has no application to
private conversations. Nothing which is said or done reasonably
and in good faith in the course of any statement, publication, discussion or debate made or held for an academic, artistic or scientific purpose or any other purpose in the public interest will be prohibited by the law.29

The Attorney General’s argument was that the legislation had builtin protection for free speech in the form of exemptions for certain
kinds of “genuine” speech that is judged to be reasonable and in
good faith.30
III. AN OVERVIEW OF AUSTRALIAN RACIAL VILIFICATION LAWS
The Australian racial vilification laws vary between state and
federal jurisdictions, but they include criminal offenses,31 civil complaints-based processes in tribunals and commissions,32 and tort
26. Nick Poynder, Racial Vilification Legislation, ABORIGINAL L. BULL., Dec. 1994, at
4 (discussing Racial Hatred Bill 1994), available at http://austlii.law.uts.edu.au/
au/journals/AboriginalLB/1994/57.html; see also Racial Hatred Act, 1995 (Austl.)
(subsequently enacted variant of the 1994 Bill).
27. Jones, Empowering Victims, supra note 25, at 310-11.
28. H.R., RACIAL HATRED BILL, EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 1 (1994) (Austl.).
29. Parliamentary Deb., H. Hansard 3337 (Nov. 15, 1994) (statement of Att’y
Gen. Lavarch).
30. Id.
31. Discrimination Act, 1991, § 67 (Austl. Cap. Terr.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1977,
§ 20D (N.S.W.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1991, § 131A (Queensl.); Racial Vilification Act,
1996, § 4 (S. Austl.); Racial and Religious Tolerance Act, 2001, § 24 (Vict.); Criminal Code,
§§ 77-80D (W. Austl.).
32. Racial Discrimination Act, 1975, § 18C (Austl.); Discrimination Act, 1991, § 66
(Austl. Cap. Terr.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1977, § 20C (N.S.W.); Anti-Discrimination
Act, 1991, § 124A (Queensl.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1998, § 19 (Tas.); Racial and Religious Tolerance Act, 2001, § 7 (Vict.).
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law.33 The state regulatory schemes operate concurrently with the
federal laws, and the Federal Act makes it clear that there is no inconsistency intended by these overlapping regimes.34 The first of the
laws was passed in the State of New South Wales in 1989, and other
states and territories followed throughout the 1990s. The federal
provisions commenced in 1995, and the last states to pass legislation
in this field were Queensland and Victoria in 2001.35 In some states,
the grounds of vilification extend to sexuality, homosexuality, transgender and transsexuality,36 HIV or AIDS status,37 and disability.38
In this Article, I will concentrate on racial vilification that is covered
by all of the state and federal acts. I will also focus on the civil complaints-based schemes since those are the provisions that have
been enforced.39
To truly understand the impact of the state and federal legislation
on free speech, it is necessary to investigate the way that the legislation has been used by complainants. Who, or at least what areas, attract complaints of racial hatred? The civil complaints are commenced before administrative commissions and tribunals.40 At the
federal level, conciliation by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission is the first step in the process; if conciliation fails,
the matter may proceed to civil action in the courts. In the Federal
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission’s annual report,
the statistics for lodgment of complaints provide a useful overview of
the range of disputes that come into the system.41 Many complaints
33. See, e.g., Civil Liability Act, 1936, § 73 (S. Austl.).
34. Racial Discrimination Act, 1975, §§ 6A, 18F (Austl.).
35. Anti-Discrimination Amendment Act, 2001 (Queensl.); Racial and Religious Tolerance Act, 2001 (Vict.). The Northern Territory is the only jurisdiction without any local
hate speech laws, but, as with the other Australian states and territories, the Northern
Territory is covered by the Federal Act.
36. Discrimination Act, 1991, §§ 66(1)(b)-(c), 67(1)(d)(ii)-(iii) (Austl. Cap. Terr.); AntiDiscrimination Act, 1977, §§ 38R-38T, 49ZS-49ZTA (N.S.W.); Anti-Discrimination Act,
1991, § 124A (Queensl.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1998, § 19(c) (Tas.).
37. Discrimination Act, 1991, §§ 66(1)(d), 67(1)(d)(iv) (Austl. Cap. Terr.); AntiDiscrimination Act, 1977, §§ 49ZXA-49ZXC (N.S.W.).
38. Anti-Discrimination Act, 1998, § 19(b) (Tas.).
39. There are no federal criminal sanctions. Most of the states have criminal offenses,
but Dan Meagher has reported that only one person has been convicted of a racial vilification crime in Australia since the first law was passed in 1989. Dan Meagher, So Far No
Good: The Regulatory Failure of Criminal Racial Vilification Laws in Australia, 17 PUB. L.
REV. 209, 210 (2006).
40. Katharine Gelber, Hate Speech and the Australian Legal and Political Landscape,
in HATE SPEECH AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AUSTRALIA, supra note 17, at 2, 9 (describing
“more mundane manifestations of hate speech”).
41. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT
2006–2007, at 74 (2007), available at http://www.humanrights.gov.au/about/publications/
annual_reports/2006_2007/pdf/hreoc_ar2006-07.pdf [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 2006–
2007]; see also Australian Human Rights Commission, Annual Reports,
http://www.humanrights.gov.au/about/publications/annual_reports/index.html (collection
of annual reports from 1996 to present) (last visited Nov. 12, 2008).
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are dismissed, withdrawn, or resolved, and thus only a few proceed to
the courts.42 The annual reports show a general decline in the number of racial hatred complaints made under the Federal Act over the
last few years. The number of these complaints fell from a high of
186 complaints in 1996-1997 to 44 complaints in 2006-2007.43 The
figures also disclose that disputes between individuals in neighborhoods and in the workplace make up a large proportion of the complaints received.44 Indeed, when the categories of “public debate,”
“media,” and “Internet” are combined, they only make up between
twenty and forty-five percent of complaints in any year.45 Some of the
high-profile and problematic cases discussed below that reach the
courts involve the media and other participants in public discourse.
However, it is worth noting the significant number of complaints that
focus on personal, neighborhood, or workplace disputes. This might
be interpreted as the regime fulfilling an educative role that was intended by Parliament when the Act was passed, but the conciliation
proceedings are confidential, and so the cases that do not go beyond
the first stage have limited impact beyond those directly involved.46
Equally, the number of personal, neighborhood, and workplace disputes can be interpreted as a disproportionate burden being imposed
upon individuals and employers while a racist discourse continues
relatively unchecked in privileged domains such as politics and the
commercial media.47

42. See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT 2006–2007, supra note 41, at 74 (reporting figures
reported for 2006-2007 for conciliation and termination of all complaints of racial
discrimination (racial hatred figures not separately recorded)). When complaints are
terminated by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, the complainant
may apply to have the allegations heard and determined by the Federal Court or the
Federal Magistrates Court. Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission Act, 1986,
§
46PO
(Austl.),
available
at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/
hraeocpacaa19861054.
43. ANNUAL REPORT 2006–2007, supra note 41, at 74; HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 1996 - 1997, at 18 (1997), available at
http://www.humanrights.gov.au/pdf/annual_reports/ar97.pdf.
44. See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT 2006–2007, supra note 41, at 74.
45. Australian Human Rights Commission, supra note 41. Statistics for racial hatred
areas of complaints were not reported in 2004-2005 and 2005-2006 annual reports.
46. Although equivocal about conciliation, Margaret Thornton has argued that it can
create a space where small victories might be achieved for minorities. MARGARET
THORNTON, THE LIBERAL PROMISE: ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION IN AUSTRALIA
170 (1990).
47. Katharine Gelber has investigated examples of the Australian Government as a
hate speaker in immigration controversies. Katharine Gelber, Hate Speech and the Australian Legal and Political Landscape, in HATE SPEECH AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN
AUSTRALIA, supra note 17, at 2, 14.
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The harm threshold for civil complaints48 varies between the state
and federal schemes. In the states, the threshold is higher: “to incite
hatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person
or group of persons on the ground of . . . race.”49 The focus of the
harm threshold in the states is the impact on the audience and
whether others are likely to be incited. In all jurisdictions, an essential element of the unlawful conduct is that the act must be done
in public.50
When considering the concept of “incitement” in the state acts,
there is no need to prove intention to incite.51 Rather, the focus is on
the effects of the public act. It is not sufficient to show that a statement was incorrect or might be inflammatory; there must be incitement of hatred.52 The provisions do not turn on proof of actual incitement of a specific person, but rather the likely effect. However,
the evidence of actual effect may be relevant to the assessment of
remedies.53 The incitement is the effect of the words on an “ordinary
reasonable” person, which is someone who is not “malevolently inclined [n]or free from susceptibility to prejudice.”54 In a New South
Wales case involving a newspaper article about Palestinians, counsel
for The Australian Financial Review submitted that an ordinary,
reasonable reader would anticipate that the paper would print balancing material, such as follow-up letters, in response to the article
and other opinion pieces.55 The tribunal did not accept that argument.56 This hypothetical person who could envisage a diverse ongoing debate was “not the ordinary, reasonable person, but rather a
person who is virtually free from susceptibility to prejudice.”57 Nor
48. The harm threshold for the criminal provisions in most of the states is threats of,
or incitement to threaten, physical harm. Discrimination Act, 1991, § 67 (Austl. Cap.
Terr.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1977, § 20D (N.S.W.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1991, §
131A (Queensl.); Racial Vilification Act, 1996, § 4 (S. Austl.); Racial and Religious Tolerance Act, 2001, § 24 (Vict.). In Western Australia, the offense involves incitement of racial
animosity or racist harassment. Criminal Code, §§ 77-80D (W. Austl.).
49. Discrimination Act, 1991, § 66 (Austl. Cap. Terr.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1977,
§ 20C (N.S.W.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1991, § 124A (Queensl.); see also Civil Liability
Act, 1936, § 73 (S. Austl.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1998, § 19 (Tas.); Racial and Religious
Tolerance Act, 2001, § 7 (Vict.).
50. The Federal and Victorian versions require that the act not be done in private.
Racial Discrimination Act, 1975, § 18C (Austl.); Racial and Religious Tolerance Act, 2001, §
12 (Vict.).
51. Kazak v. John Fairfax Publ’ns Ltd. (2000) N.S.W.A.D.T. 77, ¶ 26 (find at
http://austlii.edu.au); W. Aboriginal Legal Serv. Ltd. v. Jones (2000) N.S.W.A.D.T. 102, ¶
93 (find at http://austlii.edu.au).
52. Aegean Macedonian Ass’n of Austl. v. Karagiannakis (2000) E.O.C. ¶ 93-070,
(1999) N.S.W.A.D.T. 130, ¶ 22 (find at http://austlii.edu.au).
53. W. Aboriginal Legal Serv. Ltd., (2000) N.S.W.A.D.T. ¶ 93.
54. Kazak, (2000) N.S.W.A.D.T. ¶ 38.
55. Id. ¶ 39.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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was it relevant that a reader understands that people hold divergent
views. “The ordinary reader may well be aware for example, that
people have extreme views on white supremacy. That does not make
statements about white supremacy any less likely to incite hatred.”58
At the federal level, the harm threshold is lower:
It is unlawful for a person to do an act, otherwise than in private,
if . . . that the act is reasonably likely . . . to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate another person or a group of people . . . because
of the race, colour or national or ethnic origin of the other person
or . . . group.59

A mere slight is insufficient.60 The focus here is on the victims of the
vilifying speech and whether they are “reasonably likely” to be offended, insulted, humiliated, or intimidated. Dan Meagher has criticized the lack of any detailed analysis or reasoning in many cases in
which this harm threshold was applied and has argued that it is often exercised as a “ ‘personal discretion to do justice,’ ”61 leaving the
impression of arbitrary decisionmaking in some cases.
The “reasonably likely” phrase incorporates an objective standard62 and has been interpreted as a “reasonable victim” of the relevant race or ethnic background informed by community standards.
The historical or socioeconomic situation of the group is relevant.63
The provisions are not limited to the protection of minority groups,
but decisionmakers have held that reasonable members of majority
groups are less likely to be offended. Referring to English people as
“[p]oms”64 and yelling abusive comments at white prison officers65
have been held not to meet the requisite harm threshold. In a case
involving white prison officers, a woman was refused permission to
visit a prisoner, and she yelled abusive comments at the prison officer who was at the gatehouse.66 The Magistrate was clearly reluctant
to hold against the woman and decided that, while much of the language she used was offensive, the racial element, using the epithet
“white,” was something that a reasonable officer would not have
58. Id. ¶ 60.
59. Racial Discrimination Act, 1975, § 18C (Austl.).
60. Creek v. Cairns Post Pty Ltd. (2001) 112 F.C.R. 352, 356, (2001) F.C.A. 1007, ¶ 16
(find at http://austlii.edu.au); Kelly-Country v. Beers (2004) 207 A.L.R. 421, ¶ 87, (2004)
F.M.C.A. 336, ¶ 87 (find at http://austlii.edu.au).
61. Dan Meagher, So Far So Good?: A Critical Evaluation of Racial Vilification Laws
in Australia, 32 FED. L. REV. 225, 235-36 (2004) (quoting Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law
as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1176 (1989)).
62. Kelly-Country, (2004) F.M.C.A. ¶ 84.
63. Id. ¶ 88.
64. Bryant v. Queensland Newspapers Pty Ltd. (1997) H.R.E.O.C.A. 23 (find at
http://austlii.edu.au).
65. McLeod v. Power (2003) 173 F.L.R. 31, 46-47, (2003) F.M.C.A. 2, ¶¶ 67-69 (find at
http://austlii.edu.au).
66. See id. at 32, (2003) F.M.C.A. ¶ 2.
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found offensive.67 The Magistrate interpreted the impact of the allegedly racially offensive words in the context of a power imbalance between the white prison officer and the Aboriginal woman abusing
him. In that case, the Aboriginal woman was railing against a decision of the prison officials to refuse her entry that she could do nothing to change.68 Interpreting “reasonable” victims in this way can
avoid the potential problem, raised by some commentators, that
members of victimized groups may be punished for hate speech directed against dominant groups.69 Similarly, the Human Rights and
Equal Opportunity Commission held that a spoof documentary,
which reversed the roles of ethnographers with Africans studying
Austrian communities, was not reasonably likely to offend Austrians.70 When enacting the racial hatred provisions, the Legislature
clearly did not have in mind that these kinds of cases would be
brought by white complainants.
IV. EXEMPTION OF “REASONABLE” ACTS DONE IN “GOOD FAITH”
To properly understand the outcomes of racial hatred complaints,
it is necessary to also carefully consider the exemptions. There are
exemptions in the state and federal statutes that protect acts done
reasonably and in good faith for academic, artistic, scientific, or research purposes, or acts done in the public interest, including both
discussion and debate.71 When the exemptions were included in the
federal bill, they were criticized in submissions made to a Senate inquiry as being a “bonanza for lawyers” because of the imprecision of
the words “fair” and “reasonable.”72 The Senate inquiry also raised
concerns about who might or might not benefit from the exemptions:
67. Id. at 46-47, (2003) F.M.C.A. ¶¶ 67-69.
68. Id. at 38, (2003) F.M.C.A. ¶ 33. The Magistrate also held that the exchange did
not occur in public. Id. at 48, (2003) F.M.C.A. ¶ 73; see also Gibbs v. Wanganeen (2001),
162 F.L.R. 333, 335-37, (2001) F.M.C.A. 14, ¶¶ 3, 6, 9, 114 (find at http://austlii.edu.au).
69. See Henry Louis Gates, Jr., War of Words: Critical Race Theory and the First
Amendment, in SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING OF SEX: HATE SPEECH, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES 17, 43 (Henry Louis Gates, Jr. et al. eds., 1994); Michel Rosenfeld, Hate
Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative Analysis, 24 CARDOZO L. REV.
1523, 1525, 1566 (2003). Nadine Strossen has made a similar argument in relation to censorship of hate speech and women’s rights: “If you belong to a group that has traditionally
suffered discrimination, including women, restrictions on hate speech are especially likely
to be wielded against your speech.” Nadine Strossen, Hate Speech and Pornography: Do We
Have to Choose Between Freedom of Speech and Equality?, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 449,
470 (1996).
70. De La Mare v. Special Broad. Serv. (1998) H.R.E.O.C.A. 26, ¶ 6 (find at
http://austlii.edu.au).
71. Racial Discrimination Act, 1975, § 18D (Austl.); Discrimination Act, 1991,
§ 66(2)(c) (Austl. Cap. Terr.); Anti-Discrimination Act, 1977, § 20C(2)(c) (N.S.W.); AntiDiscrimination Act, 1991, § 124A(2)(c) (Queensl.); Civil Liability Act, § 73(1)(c) (S. Austl.);
Racial and Religious Tolerance Act, § 11 (Vict.).
72. S. LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEGIS. COMM., REPORT ON RACIAL HATRED BILL
1994, ¶ 1.64 (1995) (Austl).
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“ ‘The effect of that provision could well be simply to discriminate between the sophisticated and the unsophisticated racist: to give the
likes of David Irving a free run, and yet to make unlawful a relatively harmless schoolyard taunt.’ ”73
A spokesperson for the Australian Arabic Council was also critical
of the proposed exemption during the Senate inquiry: “ ‘[T]he effects
of the actions exempted are no less serious than the racist actions,
and the grounds for exemptions do not mitigate the effect that the
bill is ostensibly trying to address.’ ”74 The Senate Committee concluded that the exemptions might allow acts that lead to offense, insult, intimidation, or humiliation, but that it was necessary to support constitutional validity75 by accommodating freedom of expression in this way.
The Minority Committee Report in the Senate inquiry expressed
similar concerns about the exemptions in relation to artistic performances:
[T]he exclusion of artistic performances from the scope of the civil
provision of the Bill makes it laughable. A comedian can, in the
guise of an artistic performance, tell blatantly racist jokes on national television, and sell videotapes of the program for personal
profit, but those some [sic] jokes told by an ordinary citizen in a
public place such as a hotel or club, could render him/her subject to
civil proceedings . . . .
If the Government is truly concerned to stamp out racism, then
which is the greater evil: a racist joke told on national television,
or, the same joke told in the relative confines of a hotel or club?76

These concerns have been vindicated by some cases brought by Aboriginal complainants. For example, in a case involving a stand-up
comedian going by the stage name “King Billy Cokebottle,” the comedian, who was not Aboriginal, dressed up as if he were Aboriginal by
using black face paint.77 The Complainant found the character’s
name offensive and argued that use of “Kriol” English with mispronunciations held Aboriginal people up to ridicule, mockery, and contempt.78 The Magistrate agreed that the act was a “grotesque caricature”79 and said, “Aboriginal people have been the subject of racial
73. Id. (citation omitted). The Senate Committee responded that the requirement of
reasonableness and good faith would keep “sophisticated” racists from exploiting the exemptions. Id. ¶ 1.65.
74. Id. ¶ 1.68 (citation omitted).
75. Id. ¶ 1.69.
76. S. LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEGIS. COMM., REPORT ON RACIAL HATRED BILL
1994, MINORITY REPORT, at 6 (1995) (Austl).
77. Kelly-Country v. Beers (2004) 207 A.L.R. 421, ¶¶ 2, 30, (2004) F.M.C.A. 336, ¶¶ 2,
30 (find at http://austlii.edu.au).
78. Id. ¶ 31.
79. Id. ¶ 127.
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discrimination and prejudice throughout the European settlement of
Australia. As a result, they are likely to be more sensitive about
jokes directed towards them, as they are members of a minority
group, which is significantly socially disadvantaged.”80 The Magistrate accepted that the act was vulgar and in poor taste but also recognized that it was comedic in intention; he concluded that “the
character has more licence than a politician or social commentator to
express views. In the context of a stand-up comedy performance, the
offence implicit in much of [the] material does not appear to me to be
out of proportion.”81
When it comes to comedy and artistic work, the courts allow a
margin of tolerance that is not necessarily extended to speakers in
other contexts. In a case concerning a cartoon in a Western Australian newspaper, the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission held that a “reasonable” Aboriginal person would be offended by
the work,82 but that the newspaper publisher was protected by the
exemption. The Commission concluded that, “[w]hile it may be argued that the cartoon could be characterised as ‘exaggerated’ or ‘prejudiced’, I do not consider that it was sufficiently exaggerated or prejudiced (having regard to the surrounding circumstances) to breach
the standard of reasonableness.”83
Given the objectives of the Act, the idea that a “reasonable” person
may be prejudiced is troubling. The cartoon in the case entitled “Alas
poor Yagan” was published during a public controversy about the return of the skull of an Aboriginal man that had been sent to England
and displayed in a museum in Liverpool in the nineteenth century.84
The return of Aboriginal remains from museums is a matter of public
interest, and in this case, there were disputes within indigenous
communities about who had the right to negotiate and arrange the
return.85 There was also a wider public debate about government
grants given to representatives to travel to London where the representatives negotiated the return of the remains.86 The cartoon lampooned these events.87 The paper that published the cartoon could
have discussed the government funding of the trip and the disputes
within the Aboriginal communities without publishing the demeaning cartoon.

80. Id. ¶ 98.
81. Id. ¶ 127.
82. Corunna v. W. Austl. Newspapers Ltd. (2001) E.O.C. ¶ 93-146, § 8.7.3.
83. Id.
84. Bropho v. Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Comm’n (2004) 135 F.C.R. 105,
110, (2004) F.C.A. 16, ¶ 14 (find at http://austlii.edu.au).
85. Corunna, (2001) E.O.C. § 6.2.2.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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The Commission’s decision that the cartoon was published “reasonably and in good faith” as an artistic work or as part of a debate
in the public interest was upheld when reviewed by a single judge of
the Federal Court and on appeal by the majority in the full Federal
Court.88 In a dissenting judgment, Justice Lee argued that the cartoon was humiliating and demeaning and that the reasonableness of
the newspaper’s decision to publish the cartoon should be judged
against the harm it may cause:
Such harm . . . would be the extent to which that part of the community which consisted of persons who held racially-based views
destructive of social cohesion, or persons susceptible to the formation of such opinions, may be reinforced, encouraged or emboldened in such attitudes by the publication, on the ground of race, of
a cartoon which, irrespective of the intent of the artist and of the
purpose of the publisher, was capable of being seen by such persons as providing support or justification from an authoritative
source for views grounded on racial antipathy.89

In relation to the requirement of good faith, Justice Lee argued that
the publisher should have exercised prudence, caution, and diligence,
and endeavored to avoid or minimize the harmful consequences.90
The majority judges upheld the Commission’s decision that the
cartoon was published reasonably and in good faith. Justice French
suggested in dicta that the use of derogatory racist “slang” would
probably not be “reasonable,”91 and yet the cartoon was held to be
reasonable in that case. Humor and political satire is clearly accepted as part of mainstream discourse in Australia, while marginal
voices—speakers who do not conform and who use inflammatory
words or slang—are more likely to be excluded.
In the case involving a Western Australian diner owner who put
up notices about “destructive Aborigines” after her premises were
vandalized, her “short staccato expressions” were held not to be reasonable by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission.92
However, the Commission suggested that it might have been reasonable “if the respondent had published a clear account of what had
transpired and what she thought could have been done by way of remedying the endemic problems of anti-social behaviour by
Aboriginal juveniles.”93

88. Bropho v. Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Comm’n 72 A.L.D. 321, ¶ 46,
(2002) F.C.A. 1510, ¶ 46 (find at http://austlii.edu.au); see also Bropho, (2004) 135 F.C.R. at
138, (2004) F.C.A. ¶¶ 118-21.
89. Bropho, (2004) 135 F.C.R. at 141, (2004) F.C.A. ¶ 136 (Lee, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 143, (2004) F.C.A. ¶ 144.
91. Id. at 129, (2004) F.C.A. ¶ 81 (French, J.).
92. Warner v. Kucera (2001) E.O.C. ¶ 93-137, § 9.
93. Id.
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In a case brought against a Perth radio station, talkback callers
contributing to a segment called “Taxi talk” vilified members of the
Aboriginal community who were protesting about the redevelopment
of an old brewery site on land considered sacred by the Nyungah
people.94 The talkback callers claimed that the Nyungah people lie
about sacred sites and that they were really protesting because alcohol was no longer being brewed on the site.95 Redevelopment of the
site and the Aboriginal protests were matters of public interest and
had been reported in the newspapers, but the comments were not
protected by the exemption.96 The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission held that “it is the way in which the issues were
discussed, rather than the issues themselves,” which breached the
Act.97 The Commission held that the radio broadcaster did not act
reasonably when it allowed the talkback callers’ comments to go to
air.98 Clearly, comments that are exaggerated, obstinate, or prejudiced are unlikely to be held to be reasonable.
In a case before the New South Wales Administrative Decisions
Tribunal, an opinion piece with extreme negative generalizations
about Palestinians that was published by the well-regarded The Australian Financial Review newspaper was held to be unlawful.99 The
newspaper publisher failed to make out its argument that it had
acted reasonably because it subsequently published letters and articles that balanced the views expressed in the opinion piece.100 “Reasonableness must be assessed at the time of publication, not at some
unstated future time, depending on what else appears in the paper.”101 Decisions such as these seriously limit the ability of the media to act as an open forum for public debate. Editors and radio talk
show hosts are required to act as gatekeepers and exclude participants who do not behave “reasonably.”102
Australia has had some Holocaust denial and anti-Semitic literature cases; in those cases, the speakers were not protected by the exemption for acts done reasonably and in good faith. In one case, a
Tasmanian woman distributed pamphlets and sold books that included claims that the Holocaust was a myth perpetuated by Jews
for their own political purposes and that Jews are liars, fraudulent,

94. Wanjurri v. S. Cross Broad. (Aus) Ltd. (2001) E.O.C. ¶ 93-147, § 12.
95. Id.
96. See id. § 10.7.3.
97. Id. § 10.7.3.
98. Id. §§ 10.7.3, 12.
99. See Kazak v. John Fairfax Publ’ns Ltd. (2000) N.S.W.A.D.T. 77, ¶¶ 91-92 (find at
http://austlii.edu.au).
100. See id. ¶ 90.
101. Id.
102. See id.; see also Wanjurri, (2001) E.O.C. §§ 10.7.3, 12.
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immoral, and engaged in conspiracy.103 The complaint against the
woman, Mrs. Scully, was substantiated, and she was restrained from
distributing the publications or others to the same effect.104 Mrs.
Scully tried to use the proceedings to argue the “truth” of her claims
and attempted to tender more material described by the judge as polemical in character.105 The material tendered, however, was not relevant to the proceedings.106 Justice Hely emphasized that the concern in a racial hatred proceeding is not the truth or falsity of what
was claimed; that is a task best left to historians.107 Rather, the court
was concerned with whether the material was reasonably likely to offend.108 Justice Hely stated that one might cast doubt on the accepted
version of the Holocaust without contravening the Australian Act,
but in that case, the literature went beyond that discussion and vilified Jews.109 Mrs. Scully attempted to rely upon the exemption for
genuine academic purpose, but failed.110 Jews and their beliefs are
open to criticism and scrutiny, but “[t]here is a line between legitimate criticism, and prejudicial vilification of the Jewish race and
people.”111 Judge Hely held that, in that case, the respondent did not
act reasonably or in good faith.
In a similar case before the Federal Court, an Internet publisher
uploaded material to his website that talked of the “Holocaust racket.”112 Again, the Respondent’s actions were held not to be reasonable
or in good faith and were thus not covered by the exemption.113 The
court held that a degree of restraint was required: “[A] reasonable
person acting in good faith would have made every effort to express
the challenge and his views with as much restraint as was consistent
with the communication of those views.”114 Justice Kiefel stated that,
in other cases, “it may be that, in pursuing an historical or other discourse, offence cannot be avoided.”115 But in that case, the tenor of
the publications and the use of deliberately provocative and inflammatory language was not reasonable or in good faith.116 The same

103. Jones v. Scully (2002) F.C.A. 1080, ¶¶ 1, 6 (find at http://austlii.edu.au).
104. Id. ¶ 247.
105. Id. ¶¶ 41, 71, 85.
106. See id. ¶ 41.
107. Id. ¶ 176.
108. Id. ¶¶ 232, 245.
109. Id. ¶ 182.
110. Id. ¶¶ 183, 186.
111. Id. ¶ 185.
112. Toben v. Jones (2003) 129 F.C.R. 515, 522, (2003) F.C.A. 137, ¶ 12 (find at
http://austlii.edu.au).
113. Id. at 528, (2003) F.C.A. ¶¶ 43, 46.
114. Id., (2003) F.C.A. ¶ 44.
115. Id. at 532, (2003) F.C.A. ¶ 70.
116. Id. at 528, (2003) F.C.A. ¶ 45.
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message, equally offensive, could have been published if it had been
couched in more temperate language.
While the judges in these cases emphasized that Holocaust denial
was not unlawful, the court orders in the Internet case restrained
Toben from publishing any material that conveyed the imputation
that there is serious doubt that the Holocaust occurred.117 The trial
judge conceded that the practical effect of the injunction could be undermined by other publishers, but she believed that the orders had
an important symbolic and educative value.118 However, the education may be little more than how to reformat the message; this material reappeared in Toben’s “reporting” of the case.119
V. “REASONABLE” HATE SPEECH?
The interpretation of “reasonableness” in these Australian cases
excuses some forms of discourse and silences others. Anna Chapman
has criticized the way that the courts have used the reasonableness
concept in the racial hatred litigation because it “has been, deployed
to maintain dominant cultural narratives.”120 She is concerned that,
from the perspective of indigenous complainants, the “reasonableness” test is tied to the status quo and legitimizes the AngloAustralian political and legal system.121 Chapman looked at reasonableness from the “outsider” complainant perspective, but the argument can be made the opposite way. Protection of the dominant narrative can also be criticized from the perspective of the “outsider” accused of hate speech, such as the Internet and pamphlet publishers
and talkback callers. Speaking of the exemption for academic, artistic, research, and acts done in the public interest in the New South
Wales legislation, Margaret Thornton argued, “The exception is a
clear manifestation of the social reality that racist acts of social elites
are privileged, even though the harm occasioned by such acts may be
more pervasive than that arising from a crude tract.”122
The exemptions included in the Australian Acts may have placated free speech advocates when the laws were passed, but public
117. Jones v. Toben (2002) F.C.A. 1150, ¶ 113 (find at http://austlii.edu.au).
118. Id. ¶¶ 110-11.
119. Katharine Gelber, Hate Speech and the Australian Legal and Political Landscape,
in HATE SPEECH AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AUSTRALIA, supra note 17, at 2, 12. Toben
has also been found guilty of a criminal offense under German law. See Yulia A. Timofeeva, Hate Speech Online: Restricted or Protected? Comparison of Regulations in the
United States and Germany, 12 FLA. ST. J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 253, 263 (2003); Christopher D. Van Blarcum, Internet Hate Speech: The European Framework and the Emerging
American Haven, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 781, 803-04 (2005).
120. Anna Chapman, Australian Racial Hatred Law: Some Comments on Reasonableness and Adjudicative Method in Complaints Brought by Indigenous People, 30 MONASH U.
L. REV. 27, 39 (2004).
121. Id. at 38, 48.
122. THORNTON, supra note 46, at 49.
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discourse has been distorted in the process. These provisions are not
neutral and have reinforced a particular kind of restrained discourse
that may, nevertheless, have racist overtones.123 Some commentators
in the United States have questioned the effectiveness of hate speech
laws for this reason. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., for example, has contrasted the “vocabulary of indirection” with gutter epithets and argued that the former is far more painful.124 “A rule of thumb: in
American society today, the real power commanded by the racist is
likely to vary inversely with the vulgarity with which it
is expressed.”125
I do not argue that all hate speech should be unrestrained or that
all the Australian legislation should be repealed. A minimum126 of
threatening harm or inciting violence should continue to be proscribed along with severe cases of incitement of hatred. But when the
threshold is as low as the Australian Federal Act so that the giving of
offense is caught within the provisions and free speech must be protected with wide ranging exemptions, then the threshold needs to be
reviewed to avoid a bifurcation of public discourse with hateful
speech being either refined or repressed.
VI. CONCLUSION
Public debate is impoverished by the exclusion of marginal voices,
even if intemperate, and their exclusion creates an unequal public
discourse that may undermine the objectives of the hate speech laws.
Exempting newspaper cartoons and comedy acts might seem quite
reasonable on one level, but why single out for rebuke an angry outburst of a diner owner when such material is accepted as the backdrop for our national discussion of race? When hateful material is
freely communicated by speakers who know and are comfortable
with the rules of the game, it may be treated as authoritative and so
reinforce entrenched racist messages the legislation was intended to
proscribe. Australia has had a few high-profile cases involving Holocaust denial, vilification of Islam and Aborigines, but there has also
been an accumulation of small matters, conciliated in confidence or
decided in tribunals that have attracted little public attention. It is
important that the outcomes in these commission and tribunal cases
123. Gail Mason has referred to arguments that some white supremacist organizations
and Internet users have learned to comply with hate speech laws by using “correct or polite” language while continuing to communicate the same messages. Gail Mason, The Reconstruction of Hate Language, in HATE SPEECH AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AUSTRALIA,
supra note 17, at 34, 43.
124. Gates, supra note 69, at 47.
125. Id.; see also Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Let Them Talk, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 20 & 27,
1993, at 37, 45.
126. See John C. Knechtle, When to Regulate Hate Speech, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 539,
543 (2006).
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are also monitored because they can have an incremental impact on
free speech, and the inconsistencies in treatment of some speakers
can be resented.
Australia offers an interesting case study for the impact of hate
speech laws in practice. It should be a cautionary tale for advocates
of law reform in other jurisdictions. The Federal law in Australia has
a particularly low harm threshold of offending, and when this is
combined with a broad exemption for certain kinds of speech, there is
a real risk that we have created a schism within society between an
elite free to engage in restrained, but nevertheless hateful, speech
and an “outsider” group whose intemperate language can be silenced.
When balancing the right to human dignity against the right to free
expression, this is not the best way to arrange the weights.

